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Abstract
Chinas GDP growth slowdown and a surge in global nancial market volatility
could both adversely a¤ect an already weak global economic recovery. To quantify
the global macroeconomic consequences of these shocks, we employ a GVAR model
estimated for 26 countries/regions over the period 1981Q1 to 2013Q1. Our results
indicate that (i) a one percent permanent negative GDP shock in China (equivalent
to a one-o¤ one percent growth shock) could have signicant global macroeconomic
repercussions, with world growth reducing by 0:23 percentage points in the short-run;
and (ii) a surge in global nancial market volatility could translate into a fall in world
economic growth of around 0:29 percentage points, but it could also have negative
short-run impacts on global equity markets, oil prices and long-term interest rates.
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1 Introduction
Chinas real GDP growth is slowing from an average of about 10 percent over the period
19802013 to 7 percent between 2014 and 2016. The value of Chinas imports has also been
contracting signicantly since late 2014, weighing on economic growth in those exporting
countries that cater to Chinas nal demand (including Asian countries). This growth slow-
down is largely driven by Chinas gradual "rebalancing" from exports to domestic demand,
from manufacturing to services, and from investment to consumption (Figure 1).1 These
developments, together with market concerns about the future performance of the Chinese
economy, are resulting in spillovers to other economies (especially to countries in the Asia
and Pacic region) through trade links, weaker commodity prices, and nancial linkages.
Figure 1: Chinas Real GDP Growth and Rebalancing
Source: Dizioli et al. (2016).
Given the emergence of China as a global force in the world economy in recent decades,
any slowdown and change in the composition of its GDP growth can bring about signicant
spillovers to other systemic economies, and its trading partners, including those in the Asia
and Pacic region, as well as emerging market commodity exporters. This paper investigates
how shocks to GDP in China are transmitted internationally, conditional on alternative
congurations of cross-country linkages in the global economy.2 It also studies how changes
1See International Monetary Fund (2015) for details.
2While this paper focuses on negative spillovers from a GDP growth shock in China, it should be noted
that the stimulus-induced growth in China after the global nancial crisis signicantly beneted the global
economy during its recovery phase.
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in Chinas bilateral trade pattern, including that of trade in value added, may have a¤ected
the transmission of Chinas business cycles to other Asian countries over time.
Furthermore, if Chinas transition to the new growth model coincides with materialization
of domestic nancial sector risks, it has the potential to create even larger global spillovers.
To account for such possibilities, we also separately examine the international spillover e¤ects
of surges in global nancial market volatility and their dependence on the depth of nan-
cial linkages between countries (i.e., the size of their external balance sheets), in addition to
trade and commodity price linkages. We note that excessive global nancial market volatility
could emanate from disorderly macro-nancial developments in China3 and/or if advanced
countriesmonetary policy tightening occurs at an accelerated pace, among other reasons
(e.g. geopolitical tensions or sharp oil price uctuations). This additional analysis is partic-
ularly important as indicated by the summer 2015 and January 2016 episodes of heightened
global nancial market volatility (Figure 2). The VIX spiked in August 2015, when Chinas
stock market prices fell sharply despite o¢ cial support, and the renminbi xing mechanism
was adjusted, leading to renminbi depreciation vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Another are-up
occurred in January 2016 coinciding with another large price decline in Chinas stock market.
Figure 2: Market Volatility Indices
VIX Financial Stress Indicator (FSI)
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange, Cardarelli et al. (2009), and authorscalculations.
To investigate and quantify the global macroeconomic implications of Chinas slowdown,
as well as the consequences of a surge in global nancial market volatility, we employ a
dynamic multi-country framework, rst advanced by Pesaran et al. (2004), known as the
Global VAR (GVAR). This compact model of the world economy enables one to analyze the
international macroeconomic transmission of shocks (including that of Chinas growth slow-
3Dizioli et al. (2016) argue that Chinas transition to a new growth model has already coincided with
bouts of global nancial volatility as the market reassessed the underlying strength of the Chinese economy.
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down), taking into account not only the direct exposure of countries to shocks but also the
indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels. The framework comprises 26 region-
specic VARX* models (including a single Euro Area region comprising 8 of the 11 countries
that adopted the euro in 1999). These individual (VARX*) models are solved in a global
setting where core macroeconomic variables of each economy are related to corresponding
foreign variables (constructed exclusively to capture each countrys bilateral exposures to
the other countries through trade and nancial linkages). The model has both real and
nancial variables: real GDP, ination, the real equity price, the real exchange rate, short
and long-term interest rates, and the price of oil. Furthermore, we add an index of nancial
stress (FSI) as an observable common factor to the GVAR to analyze spillovers from surges
in global nancial market volatility, including from macro-nancial developments in China.
Estimating the GVAR model over the period 1981Q1 to 2013Q1, we illustrate that a
negative GDP shock in China could have signicant global macroeconomic repercussions
through trade links, weaker commodity prices, and nancial linkages, especially for less-
diversied commodity exporters and ASEAN-5 countries (except for the Philippines).4 The
e¤ects on other Asia-Pacic countries and systemic economies are smaller but not trivial.
Overall, our results suggest that following a one percent permanent negative Chinese GDP
shock (equivalent to a one-o¤ one percent real GDP growth shock), global growth reduces
by 0:23 percentage points in the short-run and oil prices fall by around 2:8% in the long run.
There is also evidence for a fall in both global ination and short-term interest rates, and
while the median e¤ect on global equity prices is negative, it is not statistically signicant.
Table 1: Trade Shares with China
Notes: Computed as the shares of exports and imports of goods of country i with China.
Source: International Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics. Authors estimations.
4ASEAN-5 countries include: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
3
The emergence of China as a key driver of the global economy over recent decades is
illustrated in Table 1. While trade with the neighboring countries in the Asia and Pacic
region as well as the systemic economics (Euro Area, the U.K., and the U.S.), was very small
in the 1980s, we notice that bilateral trade with these countries have increased many fold
over time. To give a concrete example, Chinese trade with these countries did not exceeded
4% in 1982, while it was between 8% (the U.K.) and 28% (Australia and Korea) in 2012,
with trade shares having increased between 4 (Singapore) and 23 fold (Indonesia and the
U.K.) over the last three decades. To investigate the extent to which the global impact of
a Chinese negative output shock has changed over the past three decades, we set up and
estimate a GVAR model in which the country-specic foreign variables are constructed with
time-varying trade weights, while the GVAR is solved with time-specic counterfactual trade
weights between 1982 and 2012 (see Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012) for methodological details).
Perhaps not surprisingly, our results show that the responses based on the weights in the
1980s (and in most cases in the 1990s) are not statistically signicant for either the systemic
economies or the Asia-Pacic region. Nonetheless, they are highly signicant and generally
larger based on the 2000s weights, thereby reecting the direction of evolving trade patterns,
and Chinas growing role in the global economy and world commodity markets (Table 1).
Finally, our results indicate that in response to a surge in global nancial market volatil-
ity, global economic growth decelerates in the short-run. More specically, a one standard
deviation shock to the nancial stress index5 translates into slower global economic activity
with world output falling by around 0:29% below the pre-shock level on average over the
rst year. We also observe negative short-run e¤ects on global equity prices ( 3:7%), oil
prices ( 6:5%), and long-term interest rates ( 0:03%), with the numbers in the brackets
corresponding to the peak e¤ects in the rst quarter after the shock.
Given the emergence of China as a key contributor to global growth in recent decades, it
is not surprising that the analysis of spillovers from a slowdown in Chinas GDP growth has
attracted considerable attention over the last few years, with the analytical coverage of its
implications for the global economy intensifying during the second half of 2015. However,
most of the recent analyses is qualitative/descriptive, mainly written as reports by inter-
national organizations, investment banks, and consultants (see, for instance, International
Monetary Fund (2015) and IMF Asia and Pacic Department Regional Economic Outlooks
in 2014 and 2015), or as opinion pieces by prominent economists such as Mohamed El-Erian
(writing in the Financial Times on January 7, 2015) and Paul Krugman (writing in the New
5This index measures price movements relative to trend, with a historical average value of zero (implying
neutral nancial market conditions). The magnitude of the shock is comparable to the 2002 episode of
market volatility in advanced economies and is much smaller than the Global Financial Crisis shock.
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York Times on January 8, 2015). In recent years, there have also been some papers apply-
ing various econometric and/or theoretical models (VARs, Factor Augmented VARs, OLG
and DSGE models, and event studies) to investigate the impact of a slowdown in Chinas
growth (i) on its trading partners, see, for instance, Ahuja and Nabar (2012) and Duval et al.
(2014); (ii) on particular regions, such as Anderson et al. (2015); or (iii) arising from particu-
lar sectors, see Ahuja and Myrvoda (2012). However, most of these analyses have been done
without adequate account of potential feedback e¤ects, or by ignoring the indirect exposure
of countries to the shocks (through secondary or tertiary channels, such as third-country
trade, nancial, and commodity markets). We contribute to this literature by employing the
GVAR methodology, taking into account: both the temporal and cross-sectional dimensions
of the data; real and nancial drivers of economic activity; interlinkages and spillovers that
exist between di¤erent regions; and the e¤ects of unobserved or observed common factors
(e.g. nancial stress indices and oil prices). This is crucial as the impact of shocks (e.g.
China slowdown or nancial market volatility) cannot be reduced to one country or region
but rather involve multiple regions, and may be amplied or dampened depending on the
degree of openness of the countries and their trade and nancial structures.
Most closely related to our paper is Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012), who investigate the impact
of Chinas emergence in the world economy on Latin American countriesbusiness cycles.
Our paper di¤ers from theirs in many dimensions. First, we concentrate on the impact of
Chinese GDP slowdown on Asian countries in particular, and systemic economies and global
growth in general. Second, our modelling approach is di¤erent than theirs. For instance,
oil in our model is determined in international markets, thereby allowing for both demand
and supply conditions to inuence the price of oil directly rather than having oil prices
being endogenous in the United States model (as is done in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012)).
The main justication for their approach is that the U.S. is the worlds largest oil consumer
and a demand-side driver of the price of oil. However, it seems more appropriate for oil
prices to be determined in global commodity markets rather in the U.S. model alone, given
that oil prices are also a¤ected by, for instance, any disruptions to oil supply in the Middle
East (which our modelling approach takes into account). Third, we not only investigate
the extent to which the global impact of a Chinas slowdown (and global nancial market
volatility) has changed over the past three decades, but we also consider a number of di¤erent
weighting schemes. More specically, we show that the results are similar when considering
alternative congurations of cross-country linkages in the global economy: trade weights,
trade in value added weights, nancial weights, as well as mixed weights (both trade and
nancial weights). Fourth, we extended the sample from 2009Q4 to 2013Q1 thereby including
the Great Recession and the start of the recovery from it, and more importantly including
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the period in which global trade has grown less than worlds GDP for the rst time in
decades (post global nancial crisis). Last but not least, we examine the implications of
a surge in global nancial market volatility (as measured by an increase in the Financial
Stress Indicator, FSI) in terms of its e¤ect on individual countriesGDP as well as the
global economy in general (GDP, equity prices, and commodity markets to name but a few).
Note that including a measure of FSI improves the t of the model signicantly, as FSI
captures the e¤ect of global nancial cycle (mostly overlooked in the literature).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GVAR methodology
and outlines our modelling approach. Section 3 investigates the macroeconomic e¤ects of
the China slowdown while Section 4 examines the implications of global nancial market
volatility shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes and o¤ers some policy recommendations.
2 Modelling the Global Economy
Before describing the data and our model specication, we provide a short exposition of the
GVAR methodology below.
2.1 The Global VAR (GVAR) Methodology
The Global VAR methodology consists of two main steps. First, each country is mod-
eled individually as a small open economy (except for the United States) by estimating
country-specic vector error correction models in which domestic variables are related to
both country-specic foreign variables and global variables that are common across all coun-
tries (such as oil prices and FSI). Second, a global model is constructed combining all the
estimated country-specic models and linking them with a matrix of predetermined cross-
country linkages. More specically, we consider N + 1 countries in the global economy,
indexed by i = 0; 1; :::; N . With the exception of the United States, which we label as 0 and
take to be the reference country; all other N countries are modelled as small open economies.
This set of individual VARX* models is used to build the GVAR framework. Following Pe-
saran et al. (2004) and Dees et al. (2007), a VARX* (pi; qi) model for the ith country relates
a ki1 vector of domestic macroeconomic variables (treated as endogenous), xit, to a ki 1
vector of country-specic foreign variables (taken to be weakly exogenous), xit:
i (L; pi)xit = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; qi)x

it + uit; (1)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where ai0 and ai1 are ki  1 vectors of xed intercepts and coe¢ -
cients on the deterministic time trends, respectively, and uit is a ki  1 vector of country-
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specic shocks, which we assume are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-
singular covariance matrix, ii, namely uit s i:i:d: (0;ii). For algebraic simplicity, we
abstract from observed global factors in the country-specic VARX* models. Furthermore,
i (L; pi) = I  
Ppi
i=1 iL
i and i (L; qi) =
Pqi
i=0 iL
i are the matrix lag polynomial of the
coe¢ cients associated with the domestic and foreign variables, respectively. As the lag orders
for these variables, pi and qi; are selected on a country-by-country basis, we are explicitly
allowing for i (L; pi) and i (L; qi) to di¤er across countries.
The country-specic foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the
domestic variables using data on, for instance, bilateral trade as the weights, wij:
xit =
NX
j=0
wijxjt; (2)
where j = 0; 1; :::N; wii = 0; and
PN
j=0wij = 1. For empirical application, we estimate the
model using various weights (see Section 3), thereby illustrating the robustness of our results
to the choice of wij.
Although estimation is done on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved
for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all variables are endogenous to the
system as a whole. After estimating each country VARX*(pi; qi) model separately, all the
k =
PN
i=0 ki endogenous variables, collected in the k  1 vector xt = (x00t;x01t; :::;x0Nt)0, need
to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix dened in terms of the country-specic
weights. To see this, we can write the VARX* model in equation (1) more compactly as:
Ai (L; pi; qi) zit = 'it; (3)
for i = 0; 1; :::; N; where
Ai (L; pi; qi) = [i (L; pi) i (L; qi)] ; zit = (x0it;x0it)0 ;
'it = ai0 + ai1t+ uit: (4)
Note that given equation (2) we can write:
zit = Wixt; (5)
where Wi = (Wi0;Wi1; :::;WiN), with Wii = 0, is the (ki + ki )  k weight matrix for
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country i dened by the country-specic weights, wij. Using (5) we can write (3) as:
Ai (L; p)Wixt = 'it; (6)
whereAi (L; p) is constructed fromAi (L; pi; qi) by setting p = max (p0; p1; :::; pN ; q0; q1; :::; qN)
and augmenting the p pi or p qi additional terms in the power of the lag operator by zeros.
Stacking equation (6), we obtain the Global VAR(p) model in domestic variables only:
G (L; p)xt = 't; (7)
where
G (L; p) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
A0 (L; p)W0
A1 (L; p)W1
.
.
.
AN (L; p)WN
1CCCCCCCCCA
; 't =
0BBBBBBBBB@
'0t
'1t
.
.
.
'Nt
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (8)
For an early illustration of the solution of the GVAR model, using a VARX*(1; 1) model,
see Pesaran et al. (2004), and for an extensive survey of the latest developments in GVAR
modeling, both the theoretical foundations of the approach and its numerous empirical appli-
cations, see Chudik and Pesaran (2016). The GVAR(p) model in equation (7) can be solved
recursively and used for a number of purposes, such as forecasting or impulse response analy-
sis.
Chudik and Pesaran (2013) extend the GVAR methodology to a case in which common
variables are added to the conditional country models (either as observed global factors or as
dominant variables). In such circumstances, equation (1) should be augmented by a vector
of dominant variables, !t, and its lag values:
i (L; pi)xit = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; qi)x

it +i (L; si)!t + uit; (9)
where i (L; si) =
Psi
i=0 iL
i is the matrix lag polynomial of the coe¢ cients associated with
the common variables. Here, !t can be treated (and tested) as weakly exogenous for the
purpose of estimation. The marginal model for the dominant variables can be estimated with
or without feedback e¤ects from xt: To allow for feedback e¤ects from the variables in the
GVAR model to the dominant variables via cross-section averages, we dene the following
model for !t:
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!t =
pwX
l=1
!l!i;t l +
pwX
l=1
!lx

i;t l + !t (10)
It should be noted that contemporaneous values of star variables (* superscript) do not
feature in equation (10) and !t are "causal". Conditional (9) and marginal models (10) can
be combined and solved as a complete GVAR model as explained earlier.
2.2 Model Specication
Our model includes 33 economies, which together cover more than 90% of world GDP,
see Table 2. For empirical application, we create a euro area block comprising 8 of the 11
countries that initially joined the Euro in 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the euro area are constructed as cross-
sectionally weighted averages of the domestic variables, using Purchasing Power Parity GDP
weights, averaged over the 2009-2011 period. Thus, as displayed in Table 2, the GVAR
model that we specify includes 26 country/region-specic VARX* models.
Table 2: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
Asia and Pacic North America Europe
Australia Canada Austria
China Mexico Belgium
India United States Finland
Indonesia France
Japan South America Germany
Korea Argentina Italy
Malaysia Brazil Netherlands
New Zealand Chile Norway
Philippines Peru Spain
Singapore Sweden
Thailand Middle East and Africa Switzerland
Saudi Arabia Turkey
South Africa United Kingdom
Notes:  indicates that the country is included in the euro area block.
We specify two di¤erent sets of individual country-specic models. The rst model is
common across all countries, apart from the United States. These 25 VARX* models include
a maximum of six domestic variables (depending on whether data on a particular variable is
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available), or using the same terminology as in equation (1):
xit =

yit; it; eqit; r
S
it; r
L
it; epit
0
; (11)
where yit is the log of the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, it is ination,
eqit is the log of real equity prices, rSit (r
L
it) is the short (long) term interest rate, and epit
is the real exchange rate. In addition, all domestic variables, except for that of the real
exchange rate, have corresponding foreign variables computed as in equation (2):
xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
: (12)
Following the GVAR literature, the twenty-sixth model (United States) is specied dif-
ferently, mainly because of the dominance of the United States in the world economy. First,
given the importance of U.S. nancial variables in the global economy, the U.S.-specic
foreign nancial variables, eqUS;t, r
S
US;t, and r
L
US;t, are not included in this model. The ap-
propriateness of exclusion of these variables was also conrmed by statistical tests, in which
the weak exogeneity assumption was rejected for eqUS;t, r
S
US;t, and r
L
US;t. Second, since eit is
expressed as the domestic currency price of a United States dollar, it is by construction deter-
mined outside this model. Thus, instead of the real exchange rate, we included eUS;t   pUS;t
as a weakly exogenous foreign variable in the U.S. model.6
Given our interest in analyzing the macroeconomic e¤ects of a surge in global nancial
market volatility, we need to include an index of nancial stress (FSIt) in advanced economies
in our framework. The FSIt for advanced countries is constructed by Cardarelli et al. (2009)
as an average of the following indicators: the betaof banking sector stocks; TED spread;
the slope of the yield curve; corporate bond spreads; stock market returns; time-varying stock
return volatility; and time-varying e¤ective exchange rate volatility. Such an index facilitates
the identication of large shifts in asset prices (stock and bond market returns); an abrupt
increase in risk/uncertainty (stock and foreign exchange volatility); liquidity tightening (TED
spreads); and the health of the banking system (the beta of banking sector stocks and the
yield curve). We model FSIt as a common variable, in other words, it is included as a
weakly exogenous variable in each of the 26 country/region-specic VARX* models, but we
allow for feedback e¤ects from any of the macro variables to FSIt. Finally, to capture the
inuence of Chinas slowdown on global commodity markets we also include the price of oil
(log of the nominal oil prices in U.S. dollars) as a common variable in our model.7
6Weak exogeneity test results for all countries and variables are available upon request.
7See also Cashin et al. (2017) and Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016a, 2016b) for a more detailed description
of how the global oil market is incorporated in the GVAR framework.
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2.3 Country-Specic Estimates
We obtain data on xit for the 33 countries included in our sample (see Table 2) as well as
oil prices from the GVAR website: https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling, see Smith
and Galesi (2014) for more details. As explained earlier the nancial stress index (FSIt) is
constructed using the methodology of Cardarelli et al. (2009). We use quarterly observations
over the period 1981Q12013Q1 to estimate the 26 country-specic VARX*(pi; qi) models.
However, prior to estimation, we determine the lag orders of the domestic and foreign vari-
ables, pi and qi. For this purpose, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) applied to
the underlying unrestricted VARX* models. Given data constraints, we set the maximum
lag orders to pmax = 2 and qmax = 1. The selected VARX* orders are reported in Table 3.
Moreover, the lag order selected for the univariate FSIt model is (2; 1) based on the AIC.
Table 3: Lag Orders of the Country-Specic VARX*(p,q) Models Together with
the Number of Cointegrating Relations (r)
VARX* Order Cointegrating VARX* Order Cointegrating
Country pi qi relations (ri) Country pi qi relations (ri)
Argentina 2 1 1 Norway 2 1 3
Australia 2 1 4 New Zealand 2 1 3
Brazil 1 1 1 Peru 2 1 2
Canada 1 1 3 Philippines 2 1 2
China 1 1 2 South Africa 2 1 1
Chile 2 1 3 Saudi Arabia 2 1 1
Euro Area 2 1 2 Singapore 2 1 2
India 2 1 2 Sweden 2 1 3
Indonesia 2 1 3 Switzerland 2 1 2
Japan 1 1 4 Thailand 1 1 2
Korea 1 1 3 Turkey 1 1 3
Malaysia 1 1 2 UK 1 1 3
Mexico 1 1 3 USA 2 1 2
Notes: pi and qi denote the lag order for the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The number of cointegrating relations (ri) are selected using
the trace test statistics based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all countries except for
Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, for which we reduced ri
below those suggested by the trace statistic to ensure that the persistence proles were well behaved and the
stability of the global model.
Source: Authors estimations.
Having established the lag order of the 26 VARX* models, we proceed to determine the
number of long-run relations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion, one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried out using Johansens maximal eigen-
value and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly ex-
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ogenous I (1) regressors, unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose
the number of cointegrating relations (ri) based on the trace test statistics using the 95%
critical values from MacKinnon (1991). We then consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks
on the exactly-identied cointegrating vectors using persistence proles developed by Lee
and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996). On impact the persistence proles (PPs)
are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at which they tend to zero provides
information on the speed with which equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks.
The PPs could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if
the vector under consideration is indeed cointegrated. In our analysis of the PPs, we noticed
that the speed of convergence was very slow for Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Korea, South
Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, so we reduced ri by one for each country resulting in
well behaved PPs overall. The nal selection of the number of cointegrating relations are
reported in Table 3.
3 The E¤ects of Chinas Slowdown
This section illustrates the global macroeconomic e¤ects of Chinas slowdown, including by
reporting the country-specic annual output elasticities following a one percent permanent
negative GDP shock in China and the associated 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
Figure 3 clearly shows that a Chinese negative output shock has a large (and statistically
signicant) impact on all ASEAN-5 countries (except for the Philippines), with output elas-
ticities ranging between  0:23 and  0:35 percent. The e¤ects for other countries in the
Asia-Pacic region, except for India, are also statistically signicant and range between
 0:06 and  0:17 percent. The lack of signicant spillovers to India (output in India would
reduce by less than 0:1 percent after one year) most likely reects its weak trade links with
China, its relatively closed capital account, its narrow nancial exposures to the rest of
the world, and its oil importer status hence beneting from a China-induced fall in oil
prices (see International Monetary Fund (2014) for details). Moreover, given the emergence
of China as a key driver of the global economy over the past couple of decades, it is not
surprising to observe a non-trivial (though smaller) spillover from China to other systemic
economies, with average elasticities being  0:12,  0:04, and  0:07 percent for the euro area,
U.K., and the U.S., respectively.8 It appears that countries with large trade exposures to
China are most vulnerable to negative shocks to Chinas GDP. These results are consistent
with Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012), who investigate the impact of Chinas emergence in the
8The results for the other countries in our sample, listed in Table 2, are not reported here, but are
available on request.
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world economy on Latin American countriesbusiness cycles, while we concentrate on Asian
countries and systemic economies, but also the global economy at an aggregated level.9
Figure 3: Average Output Elasticities Over the First Year Following a Negative
GDP Shock in China (Using Various Weights)
Notes: Depicts the percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% permanent decline in
Chinas GDP, equivalent to a one-o¤ one percent growth shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile
error bands. Mixed weights and trade weights are calculated based on data from 2012 while TiVa weights
are computed based on 2009 observations.
We also note that our estimated elasticities in Figure 3 are broadly in line with other
exercises based on alternative modelling approaches see Duval et al. (2014), who report
average responses of about 0:3% and 0:15% for median Asian and non-Asian economies,
respectively; and Ahuja and Nabar (2012), where the impact on the ASEAN countries are
reported to fall between 0:2% and 0:6%. Overall, Chinasize and its centrality to global value
chains mean that any economic slowdown in China will entail global spillovers, especially
through trade channels. These trade e¤ects are both direct (reduced bilateral imports by
China from its trade partners) and indirect (impact on commodity prices and third-market
e¤ects as China is one of the main trading partners (top ten) for over 100 economies that
account for about 80 percent of world GDP). It is worth reiterating that our GVAR approach
takes into account not only the direct trade exposure of countries to China but also the
indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels (i.e. exchange rates and asset prices).
9For a conditional forecast analysis of Chinas hard landing in a GVAR context, see Gauvin and Rebillard
(2015).
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Figure 4: Average Output Elasticities Over the First Year Following a Negative
GDP Shock in China (Using Time-Varying Bilateral Trade Weights)
Notes: Depicts the percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% permanent decline in
Chinas GDP, equivalent to a one-o¤ one percent growth shock.
Figure 5: Implications of a Negative China GDP Shock for the Global Economy
Notes: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in Chinas GDP,
equivalent to a one-o¤ one percent growth shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
The impact is in percentage and the horizon is quarterly.
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Comparing these results to alternative congurations of cross-country linkages in the
global economy, we set up and estimate the GVAR model using a range of other weights
(trade, trade in value added, and nancial). More specically, instead of constructing the
foreign variables, xit, using bilateral trade weights, wij, we also considered trade in value
weights, and a mixed set of weights for which we used trade weights to construct yit and 

it;
but nancial weights to construct eqit; r
S
it ; and r
L
it . The nancial weights are constructed
based on bilateral stock of portfolio investment liability positions of countries, covering both
equity and debt, derived from the IMFs Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. As is
shown in Figure 3, whether we use trade (labelled Trade), trade in value (labelled TiVa),
or nancial weights (labelled Mixed) to construct xit, the magnitudes of the elasticities
across di¤erent models are very similar, suggesting that the choice of weights is of second-
order importance. We therefore, as is now standard in the GVAR literature, only focus on
the results using trade weights. Note that the main justication for using bilateral trade
weights, as opposed to nancial weights, is that the former have been shown to be the most
important determinant of national business cycle comovements, see, for instance, Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005).
To investigate the extent to which the global impact of a China slowdown has changed
over the past three decades, we set up and estimate a GVAR model in which the country-
specic foreign variables are constructed with time-varying trade weights, while the GVAR
model is solved with trade weights for each of the years: 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007,
and 2012. Figure 4 shows that based on trade weights more than 30 years ago, a negative
Chinese output shock would not have had a large e¤ect on either the systemic economies or
the Asia-Pacic region. In fact while the estimates based on the weights in the 1980s and
1990s are not statistically signicant, they are indeed signicant based on the 2002/07/12
weights, see Figure 3.10 These results indicate that not only does a recent Chinese GDP
shock a¤ect the global economy in a much more prominent way, but the median e¤ects are
generally much larger than those of three decades ago. This is consistent with the ndings
in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012), who argue that the reason why Latin American economies
recovered much faster than initially anticipated from the recent global crisis was due to their
increasing trade linkages with China. We also argue that the emergence of China as a driver
of growth in the world economy might help to explain the "lower-than-expected" e¤ect of the
global nancial crisis on Asian countries and other emerging economies (including commodity
exporters) and the potential risks Chinas slowdown pose to these economies going forward.11
10The gures showing the statistical signicance for the di¤erent weights are not reported here, but are
available from the authors upon request.
11See also Cashin et al. (2016).
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On commodity prices, Figure 5 shows a signicant fall in oil prices in response to a
negative China output shock, with oil prices falling by 2:8 percent below their pre-shock
levels. This suggests that Chinas rebalancing a¤ects the economies of commodity exporters
in our sample mainly through its impact on global demand for commodities and associated
prices.12 For these countries, the slowdown in China translates into lower overall economic
growth.13 Overall, the results show that following a permanent 1% negative Chinese GDP
shock, global growth reduces by 0:23% in the short run. There is also evidence for a short-run
fall in both global ination and short-term interest rates, however, while the median e¤ect
on global equity prices is negative, it is not statistically signicant (see Figure 5).
4 The E¤ects of A Surge in Global Financial Market
Volatility
Excessive global nancial market volatility could emanate from disorderly macro-nancial
developments in China (see, for instance, De Bock and de Carvalho Filho 2015), and/or
if advanced countriesmonetary policy tightening takes an uncertain turn, or occurs at an
accelerated pace, especially given the already increased capital ows into emerging market
economies. The VIX spiked in August 2015, when Chinas stock market prices fell sharply
despite o¢ cial support, and the renminbi xing mechanism was adjusted, leading to renminbi
depreciation vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Another global nancial market volatility episode
occurred in January 2016 coinciding with another large price decline in Chinas stock market.
In the summer of 2013, an indication by the U.S. Federal Reserve of plans to taper its
securities-purchase program created a surge in global nancial market volatility, and resulted
in adverse spillovers to emerging market economies. Countries that experienced rapid capital
inows and strong currency appreciation pressures during 201012 saw a sharp reversal in the
2013 episode of market volatility. Given that the risk of excessive market volatility remains
in 2017, we also examine the international spillover e¤ects of surges in global nancial market
volatility on the world economy without trying to identify the cause of the shock.
Figure 6 shows that a one standard deviation shock to the nancial stress index (FSIt)
translates into a short-run lower overall economic growth globally. Specically, our estimates
suggest that world output falls on average by 0:29% below the pre-shock level in the rst four
quarters after the surge in global nancial market volatility, with this e¤ect being statistically
12See Cashin et al. (2014), Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016a), and Mohaddes and Raissi (2015) for a detailed
discussion on the e¤ects of oil prices on growth.
13See also Roache (2012) and International Monetary Fund (2012) for a detailed discussion on the outward
spillovers from China through commodity price channels.
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signicant. Not surprisingly we also observe that this shock causes oil prices to fall ( 6:5%)
and it has a negative short-run e¤ect on global equity prices ( 3:7%) and long-term interest
rates ( 0:03%), reecting increased risk aversion (the numbers in the brackets correspond
to the peak e¤ects in the rst quarter). Moreover, a widening of the output gap and lower
commodity prices likely moderate global ination slightly.
Figure 6: Implications of an Increase in Financial Market Volatility for the Global
Economy
Notes: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in FSIt,
together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in percentage and the horizon is
quarterly. The magnitude of the shock is comparable to the 2002 episode of market volatility in advanced
economies and is much smaller than the Global Financial Crisis shock.
We next turn to the implications of a sharp increase in global nancial market volatility
for individual countries. Figure 7 reports the average output responses to a one standard
deviation increase in FSIt over the rst year, together with the 16th and 84th percentile
error bands. We notice that there are signicant heterogeneities across countries in terms
of their impulse responses. In Asia, output falls between 0:17 and 0:47 percent below the
pre-shock level, with these e¤ects being statistically signicant for all countries except for
Korea, operating though trade and nancial linkages. It is worth highlighting that the e¤ects
on China and Japan are relatively larger, as real output falls by around 0:17 and 0:37 percent
on average respectively over the rst year. The commodity-price channel also leads to an
adverse impact on economic activity in commodity exporters (as oil prices fall by about 6:5
percent in the rst quarter, see Figure 6), with both Australia and New Zealand experiencing
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a fall in economic activity of 0:17 and 0:21 percent respectively. Even economic activity in
large commodity importers are a¤ected, as real output in India falls by about 0:19 percent
on average over the rst year following the shock. Finally, our estimates suggest that the
FSI shock leads to output falling by 0:32, 0:24 and 0:31 percent for the euro area, the U.K.,
and the U.S. respectively. These results echo those reported in Dovern and van Roye (2013),
who illustrate that nancial stress has signicant negative e¤ects on economic activity (as
measured by industrial production) for all of the 20 countries in their model. Interestingly
the magnitude of the responses are also in line with those depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Average Output Responses to an Increase in Global Financial Market
Volatility over the First Year (Using Various Weights)
Notes: Depicts the percent change in output of a given country associated with a one standard deviation
increase in FSIt, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The magnitude of the shock is
comparable to the 2002 episode of market volatility in advanced economies and is much smaller than the
Global Financial Crisis shock.
We argue that while strong fundamentals and sound policy frameworks are important,
they cannot fully isolate countries from the e¤ects of a sharp increase in global nancial
market volatility. This is particularly the case where there is a sudden adjustment of ex-
pectations triggered by monetary policy normalization uncertainty in advanced economies.
This argument is supported by the output responses in Figure 7, where no country (neither
advanced nor emerging market economies) appears immune from the impact of a surge in
global nancial market volatility.
Finally, we allow for alternative congurations of cross-country linkages in the global
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economy and therefore, in addition to bilateral trade weights, we also estimate the individual
country models using trade in value weights as well as mixed weights (using a combination
of trade and nancial weights), and nd that the magnitudes of the impulse responses and
their direction are generally very similar (see Figure 7).
5 Concluding Remarks
Estimating a GVAR model for 26 countries/regions over the period 1981Q12013Q1, we
analyzed the global macroeconomic implications of Chinas slowdown and the consequences
of a surge in global nancial market volatility. While the estimated spillovers from Chinas
slowdown to the rest of the world are negative, there are considerable heterogeneities across
countries (generally, those with large trade exposures to China are the most a¤ected). Specif-
ically: (i) the impact on ASEAN-5 countries (except for the Philippines) is the largest, with
growth elasticities ranging between  0:23 and  0:35 percentage points; (ii) the growth ef-
fects for the other countries in the Asia-Pacic region, except for India, are also statistically
signicant and fall between  0:06 and  0:17 percentage points; and (iii) while the estimated
China growth spillovers to other systemic countries are smaller, they are not trivial with
average elasticities being  0:12,  0:04, and  0:07 percentage points for the euro area, U.K.,
and the U.S., respectively. Overall, a 1% permanent negative Chinese GDP shock reduces
global growth by 0:23 percentage points in the short run. Moreover, oil prices fall by 2:8%
and there is a short-run fall in both global ination and short-term interest rates.
In addition, we showed that growth-spillover elasticities have become larger over time,
reecting the direction of evolving trade patterns, and Chinas growing role in the global
economy and world commodity markets. Moreover, we illustrated that a sharp increase in
global nancial market volatility could translate into: (i) a short-run lower overall world
economic growth of around 0:29 percentage points; (ii) lower global equity prices, long-term
interest rates, and oil prices; and (iii) signicant negative spillovers to emerging market
economies (operating through trade and nancial linkages).
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